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  This paper examines the relationship between the new markets for credit default swaps 
(CDS) and the pricing of syndicated loans to U.S. corporates. We find that changes in CDS 
spreads have a significantly positive coefficient and explain about 25% of subsequent 
monthly changes in aggregate loan spreads during 2000-2005. Moreover, when compared to 
traditional loan pricing factors, they turn out to be the dominant determinant of loan spreads. 
In particular, they explain loan rates much better than same rated bonds. This suggests that, 
even though CDS and bond markets may equally price market credit risk, a substantial part of 
CDS prices additionally contains loan-specific information. We also find that, over time, new 
information from CDS markets is incorporated into loans faster, but information from other 
markets is not. We argue that this indicates that the markets for CDS influence banks’ loan 
pricing behavior and thus have an impact on actual financing decisions in the economy. 
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  11. Introduction 
  Credit derivatives, famously dubbed by Alan Greenspan as the most significant financial 
innovation of the recent decade, are instruments which provide protection on credit exposures. 
While in the past credit risk was essentially untradeable, these instruments now provide banks 
with various methods for hedging and transferring credit risks. In their most common form, 
the credit default swap (CDS), they insure against the default of a credit in return for a 
periodic payment to the seller of protection. This payment, the price of a CDS, provides a 
direct measure of the compensation required by the market for taking on credit risk.
 1 
  In this paper we examine empirically how the prices of CDS relate to the pricing of new 
loans by banks. One would expect the prices in both markets to be linked to the extent that 
both are driven by credit risk. However, there are many important differences between loans 
and CDS. Loans are often collateralized and subject to covenants, and thus have their own 
risk characteristics. Their pricing may, moreover, be based on relationship arguments and 
reflect current conditions in the banking sector, rather than market prices. CDS, by contrast, 
are secondary market instruments whose prices may be driven by risk and liquidity premia. 
CDS also have specific institutional characteristics, such as the definition of the event that 
triggers the insurance. These, and other differences, speak against a robust relationship 
between both markets. 
  There are also reasons for a special link between CDS and loan markets. Credit 
derivatives now allow banks to hedge an increasing number of credit exposures. Although 
reliable data is difficult to come by, especially large banks seem to make use of this 
opportunity. For example, Deutsche Bank announced in 2003 that it plans to hedge all loans 
with a duration of more than 180 days with credit derivatives (Walter, 2003). Since the prices 
                                                 
1 Credit derivatives are rapidly developing into liquid and widely used instruments. Only introduced a decade 
ago, their notional outstanding amount has reached $ 20,200bn in 2006 and is predicted to grow to $ 35,000bn in 
2008 (British Bankers' Association, 2006). 
 
  2on CDS represent the costs of hedging, they should have a bearing upon banks’ pricing of 
loans. And even when banks are not able to hedge a loan, credit derivatives may still affect its 
price. Banks have started to calculate pseudo-prices for exposures on which credit derivatives 
are not traded. These prices now provide loan officers with an accurate benchmark for the 
pricing of loans (e.g. Kealhofer, 2002, and The Banker, 2003). They are also increasingly 
used as internal transfer prices between the bank’s loan department and its credit portfolio 
management unit and thus become a yardstick for loan officers (e.g., Beitel et. al. 2006). 
  Both markets may further be linked because banks trade actively in CDS markets. Recent 
evidence has suggested that this causes private information about lending to be revealed in the 
CDS market (Acharya and Johnson, 2005). Public lending-specific information may become 
priced as well into CDS, through banks’ hedging of loan risk. For example, a higher demand 
for loans which drives up loan prices may also raise prices in the CDS market by increasing 
banks' demand for hedging. 
  We provide evidence on the relationship between loan and CDS markets by relating the 
(interest rate) spreads on new syndicated loans to U.S. corporates to the spreads observed in 
CDS markets. We consider the period from 2000 onwards (even though credit derivatives 
have been traded since 1996) since only then CDS had become widely used and their pricing 
reliable. We focus in our analysis on aggregate data, which allows to examine loan pricing at 
regular intervals (monthly in our data).
2 Moreover, since loans as primary markets are 
presumably more sluggish than secondary markets, we look for a lagged relationship between 
loans and CDS.  
  We find that there is a close relationship between both markets. Monthly changes in CDS 
spreads are very significant in explaining loan spread changes of the subsequent month. The 
coefficient is near one, suggesting that a one basis point change in the CDS spread translates 
                                                 
2 At the firm level, new loan extensions and thus potential changes in loan rates occur only infrequently and 
irregularly. 
 
  3into a one basis point change in the loan spread. Overall, CDS spreads can explain about 25% 
of the total variation in loan spread changes.
3 When controlling for a variety of traditional 
loan pricing factors, such as the implied volatility in equity markets and macroeconomic 
conditions, the CDS spread remains strongly significant and emerges as the by far most 
important determinant of loan prices. 
  In particular, CDS spreads clearly dominate the natural alternative benchmark for loan 
pricing, the spreads on same-rated bonds. In regressions where both variables are included, 
the bond spread is insignificant. And when considered in isolation, it only adds little 
explanatory power. This is noteworthy since in accordance with previous studies we find 
bonds and CDS spreads changes to be highly correlated and both driven by market credit risk 
factors. Thus, while CDS and bonds both reflect general credit risk, CDS additionally contain 
a considerable amount of loan-specific information. This, perhaps surprising, finding can be 
explained by banks' active role in CDS markets, influencing CDS prices through their private 
lending information and hedging demand. Bond markets, by contrast, are dominated by 
institutional buy-and-hold investors and hedging credit risk through shorting bonds is difficult 
there. The finding can also be explained by an impact of CDS on loan pricing, arising because 
CDS spreads represent the costs of hedging loans, or simply because they provide the pricing 
benchmark. 
  We also address the question of how long it takes for information from the CDS market to 
be reflected in loan prices. We find that in order to explain average loan spreads in a month in 
the first half of our sample, only information generated in the CDS markets after the third 
week of the previous month is needed. Hence, CDS information is relatively quickly reflected 
in actual loan decisions. The lag even shortens over time, as in the second half of our sample 
CDS information from the previous month no longer explains loan changes in the current 
                                                 
3 By means of comparison, firm-level studies can typically explain in total about 25% of (weekly) bond spread 
changes using a wide set of explanatory factors (e.g., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001, and Blanco, 
Brennan and Marsh, 2005). 
  4month. Moreover, throughout the sample the coefficient for same month CDS information 
rises gradually, indicating an increasing weight on current information. 
  The shortening of the lag suggests that either CDS markets or the pricing of loans by 
banks (or both) have changed during our sample period. CDS markets have presumably 
become more efficient in recent years. Hence, they should incorporate new information 
quicker, which per se increases the lag of the loan market. Changes in CDS markets are thus 
an unlikely explanation of the shortening of the lag, suggesting that it is due to banks pricing 
new information faster into loans. Interestingly, we find that this seems to be limited to 
information from CDS prices: the relation between loan spreads and same-month non-CDS 
information (relative to previous month information) does not strengthen during our sample 
period. This suggests that banks' loan pricing behavior has changed in the presence of CDS 
markets. 
  Overall, even though there are a priori many reasons for why the prices on new loans and 
CDS may differ, we find that both are strongly linked. Our findings suggest that the relatively 
young credit derivatives markets have very rapidly developed an important role in the 
financial system by closely relating to actual financing decisions, and thus beyond being 
purely a ‘financial instrument’. 
  Recent empirical studies have addressed other aspects of credit derivatives and bank 
lending. Acharya and Johnson (2005) provide evidence for insider trading in the CDS market 
and show that it is related to the number of bank relationships of a traded reference entity. 
They argue that this is consistent with banks using CDS markets to exploit their informational 
advantage from the syndicated lending market. Our finding of the CDS market containing 
substantial loan-specific information is supportive of such a role of banks in CDS trading.  
Marsh (2006) considers the impact of the announcement of a new bank loan on a firm's public 
debt (as first studied by James, 1987). He presents evidence that the announcement effect is 
lessened when the lending bank actively trades in credit derivatives. This suggests that the 
  5uniqueness of bank loans is eroded through credit derivatives, consistent with the theory that 
hedging may undermine monitoring incentives (e.g., Morrison, 2005). Goderis et al (2006) 
study the impact of credit risk transfer through Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) on the 
amount of bank lending. They find that subsequent to issuing their first CLO, banks increase 
their lending by an amount that more than offsets the actual risk shed with the CLO. This is 
interpreted as CLOs providing a new risk management tool for banks, allowing them to 
operate with riskier balance sheets. In a similar vein, Hirtle (2007) shows that U.S. banks 
which purchase protection using credit derivatives increase their loan supply. These two 
papers indicate that credit derivatives have a quantity effect for loans. Our results suggest that 
they also interact with the pricing of loans. 
  While our paper considers the time-series dimension of loan rates, the loan pricing 
literature has mostly focused on explaining differences in loan rates across borrowers (e.g., 
Strahan, 1999). Carey and Nini (2004) compare spreads on European and U.S. syndicated 
loans. They find, after controlling for a variety of factors, European spreads to be significantly 
smaller than U.S. spreads, which indicates a lack of integration of loan markets.
 4 Cook and 
Spellman (2005) compare prices on loans and bonds of the same borrower. They match prices 
at the date when a new loan is originated and find that for highly rated firms, loan rates 
command a premium over bonds; while for lower rated firms they are discounted. An 
exception from the focus on the cross section is Altman, Gande and Saunders (2006) who 
study the relation between secondary market prices for loans and bonds. They find that loans 
react more strongly than bonds prior to an information sensitive event but react less in the 
period immediately before and after the event. This suggests a monitoring advantage of loans 
over bonds, even when loans are traded. 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, we find that U.S. loan rates are driven by global CDS markets (and not the U.S. CDS market). 
This suggests that, while loan markets may not be integrated across continents, loan officers at least take into 
account global credit conditions when pricing loans. 
 
  6  While our study is the first to establish a relationship between credit derivatives and 
pricing in primary markets, previous literature has analyzed their interaction with secondary 
market prices by means of time-series econometrics and in event studies (e.g., Hull, Predescu 
and White, 2004, Norden and Weber, 2004, Blanco, Brennan and Marsh, 2005, Houweling 
and Vorst, 2005, and Norden and Weber, 2006). This research is based on a higher frequency 
(since secondary market data is available on a daily basis) and finds that CDS markets, 
compared to bond and equity markets, provide a substantial part of the overall price 
discovery. Our results suggest that CDS markets are perhaps even more important for primary 
markets, as nearly all loan-specific information is generated there. 
  The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the data and 
presents summary statistics. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis. The final section 
summarizes and offers conclusions. 
 
2. Description of the data 
2.1. Data sources and variables 
  In this study we analyze time series of aggregate loan spreads. On the firm-level, loan 
spreads changes occur only infrequently and irregularly, making it difficult to analyze time-
series variations. Our aggregate loan spread time series comprises only new loans and thus 
has the advantage that it always reflects current loan market conditions. It can also be 
observed at a regular frequency (monthly in our study). The obvious disadvantage is that one 
cannot easily control for borrower-specific variables, which have been found important in 
earlier studies (e.g., Strahan, 1999). A priori, this should make it more difficult to identify a 
link between CDS prices and loan rates. 
  Despite borrower-specific differences, the prices of CDS and loans may also differ due to 
a variety of institutional characteristics, such as re-negotiation rights in loan contracts, the 
  7cheapest-to-delivery option in some CDS spreads,
 5 and different definitions of the default 
event (for an excellent overview of these issues, see Cook and Spellman, 2005). These 
features may increase or decrease credit spreads in one market relative to those in other 
markets. If these differences are time varying, they may further bias our results against 
finding a robust relationship between CDS and loan spreads. 
  Our data set comprises a time series of corporate loan spreads, credit default swap 
spreads, corporate bond spreads and macroeconomic control variables. Loan spreads are 
provided by the rating agency Standard & Poor’s for the period January 1998 to March 2006.
6 
These spreads are monthly averages of first-lien syndicated loans to U.S. firms with a credit 
rating of BB/BB- and B+/B. These loan spreads are computed from newly issued loans 
(typically 60 to 80 deals per month) and do not reflect rates on outstanding loans. Hence, they 
represent loan pricing decisions of a given month. We consider these loan spreads more 
representative for large firms, for which syndication is the dominant form of bank financing.  
  Loans are priced with floating rates, i.e. they consist of a risk-free rate (usually the swap 
rate) plus a credit spread. Our data allows us to distinguish between straight spreads (without 
fees) and all-in spreads (with upfront fee, hypothetically amortized over three years). We 
focus on straight spreads because (i) credit spreads from the CDS and the bond market do not 
include fees, (ii) we found fees not to vary systematically with the straight spread levels, and 
(iii) the size of the fees is relatively small compared to the total spreads. 
                                                 
5 CDS may specify a range of obligations which can be delivered in a default, giving the protection buyer the 
option to deliver the cheapest one. 
6 We have also access to average (primary) loan spreads from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). We prefer to 
use the S&P loan spreads because they include only new loans (and not outstanding loans). We also ran 
regressions for secondary market loan spreads obtained from LPC and found that our main results continue to 
hold. 
  8  Our CDS market data are daily CDS spreads for more than 300 global references entities 
from CreditTrade
7 and one large universal bank
8 for the six-year period from January 2000 to 
December 2005. We only consider CDS spreads which refer to senior unsecured corporate 
debt and have a benchmark maturity of five years. Note that constant maturity CDS spreads 
are quoted on a daily basis, reflecting the market’s most recent assessment of credit risk. Like 
loans spreads, CDS are quoted above floating rates such as LIBOR or EURIBOR. From these 
spreads we calculate different types of equally weighted monthly CDS spread indices. For 
example, we differentiate by regions (global, US, Europe), by rating grades (AAA, AA, ... , 
BBB), and by frequency. For the latter we use both averages of a month but also daily prices 
at a given point in time in each month (end-of-month, end-of-week). 
  Corporate bond spreads are calculated from a monthly time series of the Lehman Brothers 
U.S. corporate high-yield indices (for rating grades BB, B and all non-investment grade firms) 
minus a risk-free rate. For the risk-free rate, we follow previous studies and take the five-year 
plain vanilla swap rate from Thomson Financial DataStream (e.g. Hull, Predescu and White, 
2004, Norden and Weber, 2006).
9 This makes bond spreads comparable to loan and CDS 
spreads because these are calculated above swap rates as well. We construct monthly averages 
for the bond spreads as well as end-of-month bond spreads.  
  Moreover, we consider a large set of variables to control for the most important 
macroeconomic determinants of credit spreads (e.g. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin, 
2001, Elton et al., 2001). More specifically, we use aggregate stock market information (the 
S&P 500 return and the implied volatility index VIX for S&P 500 stock index options from 
the CBOE), debt markets information (the 5 year swap rate, the term premium calculated as 
the ten-year minus the one-year yield), the liquidity of CDS markets (the relative bid-ask 
                                                 
7 For a description of this data, see Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) and Acharya and Johnson (2005). 
8 The bank requests to stay anonymous. Another potential data source would be a CDS index, such as the iTraxx 
and DJ CDX. However, a U.S. version of both indices did not exist at the beginning of our sample period. 
9 In preliminary analyses we also calculated bond spreads above same-maturity yields of U.S. Treasury bonds, 
which yielded similar results. 
  9spread of CDS quotes), general macroeconomic conditions (industrial production IP, 
consumer price index CPI), and rating agency actions (the percentage share of all downgrades 
by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch relative to all rating changes in a particular month, 
DOWN). The latter variable reflects changes in the opinion of rating agencies which may 
contain relevant information for the pricing of new loans or new CDS contracts. 
  The final data set results from the intersection of the above described variables, leading to 
a monthly time series of 72 observations from January 2000 to December 2005. 
 
2.2. Descriptive statistics of key variables from the loan, bond and CDS market 
  Figure 1 depicts the evolution of loan, bond and CDS spreads over the sampling period. 
We decided to use CDS spreads from all global reference entities in our analysis (and not only 




Insert Figure 1 here 
 
  It can be seen that the loan spreads are relative high and stable during the period 2000-
2002, while they decrease during the second half of the sample. CDS and bond spreads both 
rise in the first half and decrease, similar to loan rates, in the second half. Generally speaking, 
the three series behave similar but there seem to be also important differences between them. 
  Table 1 displays descriptive statistics such as the time series mean, standard deviation etc. 
for spread levels and for first differences of spread levels.
11 The two rightmost columns report 
results from two types of stationarity tests.
12  
                                                 
10 However, both variables are highly correlated (their correlation is 0.95). 
11 Note that we use matching rating data for bond and loans but use averages across ratings for CDS spreads. The 
reason is that some rating classes had few or no observations during the first half of our sample (this may bias 
our results when there are rating migrations, an issue to which we return later). 
  10 
Insert Table 1 here 
  
  In can be seen that loan spreads L
B exhibit a mean of 344 basis points, ranging between 
235 and 511 basis points during the sample period. As expected, loan spreads for the better 
rating grade L
BB display a lower mean of 277 basis points. Bond spreads are on average 
higher than their corresponding loan spreads. CDS spreads, either end-of-month or monthly 
average, are on average roughly 82 basis points. From stationarity tests we have that all time 
series of spread levels are non-stationary, i.e. they are not suited as inputs for a standard 
regression analysis. However, both stationarity tests reveal that the time series of spread 
changes are stationary for all variables. Consequently, we will use in our regression analysis 
all variables in first differences.
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. The baseline model 
  In this section we introduce a simple regression model to analyze whether there is a link 
between the prices of CDS and loan spreads.  
  Some methodological explanations are in order. First, we expect primary loan markets to 
react more sluggishly than CDS markets. Therefore, we focus on identifying a lagged 
relationship between both markets (in Section 3.4 we analyze whether there is also a 
contemporaneous relationship). In particular, we will use the end-of-month CDS spread of the 
previous month to explain the loan spreads of the current month. This ensures that there is no 
overlap with the loan rate data (which are monthly averages) but allows loans to react to most 
recent (lagged) data (to check robustness, we also run regressions with average CDS spreads, 
                                                                                                                                                          
12 The (augmented) Dickey Fuller test has a null hypothesis of non-stationarity while the KPSS test has a null 
hypothesis of stationarity. 
  11both contemporaneous and lagged). Second, we consider the lowest rated loans in our sample 
(S&P rating: B), for which we expect the largest variations. Third, as mentioned beforehand, 
we use global CDS spread changes since they seem to dominate those of U.S. reference 
entities. Finally, we include the lagged loan spread change to control for serial correlation of 
this variable. The lagged loan spread change can also be interpreted as a naive benchmark for 
the lagged CDS spread change. The estimation results for the baseline model are summarized 
in Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
  It turns out that the baseline model does a surprisingly good job. The estimated coefficient 
of lagged CDS spread changes is highly significant (p-val. < 0.01), correctly signed and with 
a magnitude of 1.14 economically meaningful. In other words, CDS spread changes from the 
previous month translate roughly 1:1 into loan spread changes of the current month. The 
explanatory power of this simple model is relatively high (R
2=0.33). This is striking because 
we expected that a model which explains (primary) loan spreads would perform substantially 
worse than models for corporate bond spread changes, which usually produce R
2 values 
around 0.25 (e.g. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin, 2001, Blanco, Brennan and Marsh, 
2005). The lagged loan spread change is significantly negative at the 0.05-level but its 
magnitude is much smaller than the CDS coefficient. The negative sign is evidence for serial 
correlation which leads to a mean-reverting behavior of loan spreads.
  We re-estimate this 
model without the lagged dependent variable and obtain an R




  To our knowledge, this finding represents the first empirical evidence of a significant 
and positive link between credit derivatives and loan markets. In the next section, we check 
  12the robustness of this result to the inclusion of additional variables, alternative estimation 
techniques, and alternative variable definitions. 
 
3.2. Model extensions and robustness tests 
  We first extend the baseline model by macroeconomic variables which have been 
identified as important determinants of credit spread changes (e.g. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein 
and Martin, 2001). First and foremost, we include bond spreads. Bond spreads, like CDS 
spreads, also represent a required compensation for credit risk and are thus the natural ‘rival’ 
for CDS spreads. In addition, we include lagged changes of the implied volatility of equity 
(ΔVIX), the return on the S&P 500 index (R_SP500), the five year swap rate (ΔSWAP5), the 
term premium (ΔTERM), the consumer price index (ΔCPI), industrial production (ΔIP), the 
change of the share of rating downgrades relative to all rating changes (ΔDOWN), and, as a 
liquidity proxy, the relative bid-ask spread from the CDS market (ΔRELS). Accounting for 
changes in liquidity is important since recent research has suggested that CDS spreads, in 
addition to a compensation for default risk, include also liquidity premia (see Longstaff, 
Mithal and Neis, 2005). Table 3 displays the estimation results for four model specifications. 
In addition to CDS spreads, Model I includes two main control variables, bond spreads and 
equity volatility. Model II is based on bond spreads, equity volatility and the share of rating 
downgrades (but no CDS spreads) while Model III includes all control variables (except CDS 
spreads). Finally, we consider all macro variables and CDS spreads in Model IV. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
  The main observation is that the CDS spread remains highly significant when controlling 
for other variables. In Model I its coefficient decreases modestly to 1.08, from 1.14 in the 
baseline model. In the full model (Model IV) it decreases to 1.05. Also, adding the control 
  13variables to a model with CDS spreads does not substantially increase the goodness-of-fit: the 
adjusted R
2 only increases from 0.31 in the baseline model (Table 2) to 0.34 in the full model 
(Model IV). Hence, CDS spread changes are our most important determinant of loan spread 
changes. Note also that, although macro variables on their own have explanatory power 
(R
2=0.23 in Model II and Model III), only the lagged dependent variable appears as 
significant in most of the specifications. Nonetheless, it can be seen that equity volatility and 
the share of downgrades are statistically significant and correctly signed when we leave out 
CDS spreads (Model II). 
  One may argue that loan and CDS spread levels are cointegrated. If this is the case, then 
information about the adjustment towards the long run equilibrium can be used as additional 
information for the analysis of spread changes. Therefore, we also estimate a vector error 
correction model (VECM) for loan spreads, CDS spreads and bond spreads. For this (as in the 
previous table), CDS and bond spread changes are measured at the end of each month to 
ensure synchronicity between these variables. Table 4 reports the cointegration equation 
(Panel A) and the short-run adjustment model for the loan spread changes (Panel B). 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
  From Panel A, it can be seen that there is indeed a long-run relationship between the three 
variables. Most important, Panel B shows that the results from the baseline model are 
confirmed. The relation between CDS spread changes and loan spreads changes remains 
basically unchanged. The coefficient for ΔC
eom
t-1 slightly increases to 1.26 and remains 
significant at the 0.01-level. The error correction term (ECt) is significantly negative at the 
0.01-level with a coefficient of –0.27. The R
2 increases to 0.42, indicating the importance of 
the adjustment process towards the long-run equilibrium. 
  14  Moreover, we also conduct several additional tests to examine the sensitivity of the 
baseline model to the choice of variables and the model specification. For example, using the 
loan spread change for BB-rated firms ΔL
BB
t (instead of B-rated firms) as dependent variable 
in the baseline model gives similar results. The only noteworthy effect is that the coefficient 
of the CDS spread change is slightly lower. A potential concern about the baseline model may 
be that it includes the average CDS spread across all firms, but loan spreads are always 
considered for firms with the same rating. Our results may hence be influenced by rating 
migration. We check this issue by using instead the CDS spread for BBB-rated firms and 
CDS spreads which are scaled to a rating level of BB
13 in order to adjust for the difference in 
the underlying default risk and find our main results confirmed.
14 Our baseline model is also 
confirmed in terms of statistical and economic significance when we replace the lagged end-
of-month CDS spread change ΔC
eom
t-1 by the lagged monthly average CDS spread change 
ΔCt-1 (however, as already said earlier, we prefer the end-of-month measure to allow for the 
most current information to be reflected in loan rates). Furthermore, we also run our baseline 
model for spreads which are computed in relative rather than absolute terms. The results 
support those of the baseline model. Finally, instead of running the OLS regression with 
robust standard errors we re-estimate the baseline model using the Newey-West estimator (for 
a lag length of 3), which also adjusts for serial correlation, and obtain highly similar results. 
  We conclude that the various model extensions and tests of robustness confirm the results 
of the baseline model. 
 
3.3. Loan-specific information in CDS and bond spreads 
                                                 
13 We have data on CDS spreads for BB-rated firms only for the period April 2002 to December 2005. For the 
scaled CDS spreads we calculate synthetic CDS spreads for the period January 2000 to March 2002 by 
estimating the relationship between CDS spread changes for BBB- and BB-rated firms during the period for 
which the data is available. 
14 This is consistent with the fact that the mean rating of all CDS reference entities changes only modestly over 
the sample period. It deteriorates by 1.10 grades from 5.98 (A) to 7.08 (A-), measured on a 17 grade scale 
(1=AAA, 2=AA+, …, 17=CCC+). 
  15An interesting result from the previous section is that, although CDS and loan markets are 
closely linked, there does not appear to be a similarly strong relationship between bond and 
loan markets. This is surprising, since CDS and bond spreads both price credit risk. In this 
section we examine this issue further. 
  We first add bond prices to our baseline model. Table 5, Panel A, reports the estimation 
results for the baseline model augmented by lagged corporate bond spread changes. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
  The coefficient of bond spread changes is not significant at all, while the CDS-loan 
relationship is as in the baseline model. Since CDS and bond spread levels are correlated (the 
Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.72), this result may be partly driven by multicollinearity. 
Therefore, we repeat the same regression with bond spread changes only. As can be seen from 
the two rightmost columns in Panel A, we obtain a positive coefficient for bond spread 
changes of 0.11 but it is only marginally significant. The CDS coefficient of 1.34 estimated 
earlier is substantially larger, indicating that the link is much stronger for the CDS market. 
The difference is even more pronounced when the explanatory power of bonds is considered: 
in comparison to the baseline model (Table 2) the inclusion of bond spreads does not help to 
increase the adjusted R
2 at all. We conclude that bond spreads contain considerably less loan-
specific information than CDS spreads. 
  Our next step is to study the loan-CDS link and the loan-bond link separately. For this 
purpose we separately regress loan spread changes on CDS and on bond spread changes (both 
contemporaneous and lagged). Results are summarized in Table 5, Panel B. Consistent with 
the baseline model and results from Panel A, we find that lagged CDS spread changes are 
significantly positively related to loan spread changes while bond spread changes are not 
significantly linked (neither contemporaneous nor lagged) to loan spread changes. Most 
  16striking, comparing the goodness-of-fit of both regressions reveals that the explanatory power 
of the CDS model (R
2 = 0.34) is roughly three times higher than that of the bond model (R
2= 
0.12).  
  A potential explanation for these results may be that bond prices are not strongly related to 
loan prices simply because they do not reflect general credit risk well. Therefore, we 
investigate how CDS and bond spread changes are related to other general (that is not loan-
specific) credit risk factors. More specifically, we take important determinants of credit 
spreads from the stock market (the equity volatility ΔVIX and the S&P 500 returns R_SP500) 
and debt markets (the five year swap rate ΔSWAP5 and the term premium ΔTERM) to 
explain both types of credit spreads. Estimation results are presented in Table 5, Panel C. 
CDS spread changes are significantly positively related to ΔVIX and significantly negatively 
to R_SP500 and ΔSWAP5. Bond spread changes are significantly positively related to ΔVIX 
and ΔTERM and significantly negatively to ΔSWAP5. The signs of these factors are in line 
with theoretical explanations and existing empirical evidence (e.g. Blanco, Brennan and 
Marsh, 2005). Most interesting in our context, however, is that the R
2 is much higher for the 
bond spread regression (0.71 vs. 0.42). Estimating the same model with loan spread changes 
as dependent variable gives a very small R
2 of 0.04 (see also Table 3). Consequently, 
corporate bond spreads are more strongly related to general credit risk factors than CDS 
spreads (and loan spreads). 
  Taken together, the following picture of the relation between loans, bonds, and CDS 
emerges. Loan markets cannot be well explained by general credit spread determinants. 
Secondary market spreads from the CDS market can explain loan spreads but secondary 
market bond spreads cannot. However, this is not due to a better ability of the CDS to price 
(general) credit risk. In fact, both CDS and bonds relate highly to general credit risk factors 
(and bonds even more so). Thus, it seems to be that the CDS prices a considerable amount of 
  17loan-specific information (that is, information unrelated to general credit risk).
15 This in turn 
also explains why bonds may be more related to general credit risk factors. 
  There are good economic explanations for the better ability of CDS markets to generate 
loan-specific information and the better ability of the bond market to reflect general credit 
risk. Market participants in CDS and bond markets are rather different. Bonds mainly 
represent buy-and-hold investments for institutional investors. These institutions may not 
have loan exposures and hence bond markets mainly reflect general market risk. By contrast, 
in the CDS markets banks do a large part of the trading. They have incentives to exploit their 
informational advantage, leading to loan-information being revealed in the CDS market. In a 
related paper, Acharya and Johnson (2005) have provided evidence consistent with such 
insider trading by banks. Banks, moreover, also have a demand for hedging their loan 
exposures. They now increasingly use CDS for hedging,
16 further causing loan market 
conditions to be priced into the CDS market. By contrast, large-scale hedging is practically 
unfeasible in bonds markets, as it is difficult to go short in bonds (e.g. Hull, Predescu and 
White, 2004, Blanco, Brennan and Marsh, 2005). 
 
3.4. Lag length and responsiveness of loan spread changes over time 
  The previous analysis has shown that loan spreads respond to previous-month information 
from the CDS market. In this section we take a closer look at the lag relationship and how it 
evolves over time. We also address the question of whether loan spreads have perhaps 
become more responsive to CDS markets over time.  A faster and stronger response of loan 
                                                 
15 Examples for loan-specific information are structural changes in the banking sector (like mergers and 
acquisitions, changes in competition, new regulatory requirements for banks etc.) or changes in the demand for 
loans (e.g., arising from changes in collateral). 
16 Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2006) analyze the motivation of large U.S. banks to engage frequently in the 
credit derivatives markets. Consistent with our presumption of credit derivatives being used for hedging, they 
find that the probability of a bank being a net risk hedger is positively linked to the percentage of commercial 
and industrial loans in a bank's credit portfolio. 
  18spreads would be consistent with the views expressed by practitioners that banks increasingly 
make use of CDS information to price loans. 
  We first take a rough approach to check whether the lag relationship has changed over 
time. We take the baseline model and add the contemporaneous average monthly CDS spread 
change ΔCt as the explanatory variable. We then run separate regressions for the first and the 
second half of our sample (March 2000 – January 2003 vs. February 2003 – December 2005). 
In these regressions we use the monthly averages of the contemporaneous CDS spread (rather 
than the end-of-month spread) to ensure that it covers the same time period as the loan spread 
variable (which is also a monthly average). Results are shown in Table 6, Panel A. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
  The results indicate a change in the average lag length. In the first half of the sample the 
coefficient of the lagged CDS spread change is 1.21 and significant but the contemporaneous 
CDS spread change is insignificant. In the second half of the sample, the coefficient of the 
lagged CDS spread change becomes insignificant and the contemporaneous one becomes 
positive and significant. This suggests that information from CDS markets is incorporated 
into loan decisions faster. Moreover, Panel A also shows that the estimated coefficient of ΔCt 
takes a value of 2.06 in the second half, while the significant CDS coefficient in the first half 
was 1.21. This indicates that loan spread changes have also become more responsive to CDS 
spread changes in recent years. 
  Our next test takes are more refined look at the lag relationship, using weekly data from 
the CDS market. To this end we transform daily CDS spreads into end-of-week CDS 
spreads
17 and calculate the corresponding monthly first differences (denoted ΔCw). We then 
                                                 
17 These end-of-week variables are constructed from splitting the month into four equal periods (whenever 
possible) and hence do not literally refer to the end of a calendar week. 
  19include various versions of these spreads into our loan regressions. Again, we split the sample 
in two sub-periods. For each sub-period we run eight regressions, each including a different 
end-of-week CDS spread change, starting with the change between the last week of the 
current month and the last week of previous month and finishing with the change between the 
first week of the previous month and the first week of the month before. Results are displayed 
in Table 6, Panel B.  
  For the first half of the sample we obtain significantly positive coefficients for ΔCw for 
weeks 3, 2, 1 of the current month and week 4 of the previous month. The maximum 
coefficient of 1.40 is found for week 4 of the previous month. Note also that the significant 
coefficients decrease as they become more recent. For the second half of the sample, only 
coefficients from the current month are significant. A comparison between the sub-samples 
suggests that the loan market now reacts more to recent CDS information. For example, while 
the maximum coefficient for ΔCw in the first half is observed in week 4 of the previous 
month, the same coefficient is no longer significant in the second half. Instead, CDS 
information from the current month becomes more important in terms of statistical and 
economic significance. The maximum coefficient is now observed for week 3 of the current 
month. Analyzing the R
2 values for the different regressions gives a similar picture. 
  To shed more light on the evolution of the loan market reaction to CDS spreads over time 
we carry out a rolling window analysis of the model in Panel A. We start with the first half of 
the sample (March 2000 – January 2003) and then roll forward a window of 35 observations 
on a month-by-month basis until we obtain the second half of the sample period (February 
2003 – December 2005). Regression results are displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
  20  The rolling window analysis indicates a relatively clear pattern. Figure 2a indicates that 
the coefficient of the lagged end-of-month CDS spread change is above one for a long period 
and then decreases. At the time where the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval (the 
shaded area above and below the solid line) reaches zero, the coefficient is no longer 
statistically significantly different from zero. From Figure 2b it can be seen that the 
coefficient of the contemporaneous CDS spread change is near to zero for most of the time 
but then rises quickly above one in the last of the rolling windows. Overall, the analysis 
indicates that the link between CDS and loan markets has been a lead-lag relationship during 
windows 1-23. Then, there is a period of transition of six months with no clear lag. Starting 
from window 30 (July 2002) we observe a contemporaneous link between both markets. 
Interestingly, during that period many firms experienced credit rating downgrades and there 
was a sharp increase in CDS spreads. 
  We now analyze whether the move towards a more contemporaneous loan pricing 
relationship is unique to CDS spreads, or whether it also applies to other determinants of 
credit spreads. To examine this issue, we compare loan spread regressions which include 
contemporaneous credit spread determinants with ones where the determinants are lagged. 
We do this for the first and the second subperiod and then draw conclusions from how the 
goodness-of-fit of the regressions has changed over time.
18 For the regressions we use the 
macro model without CDS spread changes (see Model III in Table 3) and a simple CDS 
model, which includes only the lagged dependent variable and CDS spread changes. 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
                                                 
18 Since there are now a variety of explanatory variables, it is less instructive to draw conclusions about the 
strength of the lead-lag relationship from estimated coefficients (as we did in Table 6 for CDS spreads). 
  21  It can be seen that for the macro model (the model without the CDS spread changes) the 
regression with lag 1 of the explanatory variables leads to a higher R
2 in both sub-periods. 
Moreover, the difference in the R
2 remains basically unchanged in the sub-periods (0.27 
versus 0.22 in the first, and 0.20 versus 0.16 in the second half). Hence, there does not seem 
to be a shift towards a contemporaneous relationship between these variables and loan spread 
changes. In contrast, for the CDS model (which includes only CDS spread changes as 
explanatory variables) we find a considerably higher goodness-of-fit for lagged CDS spreads 
(relative to contemporaneous ones) in the first half (0.43 versus 0.18). The opposite is true in 
the second half of the sample (0 versus 0.16), where the ability of lagged CDS spread changes 
to explain loan spread changes completely vanishes in favor of a contemporaneous loan-CDS 
relationship. These results suggest that the faster response of loan pricing is unique to 
information from the CDS markets. 
  Summarizing, the analysis in this section provides evidence that during the last years loan 
markets have started to reflect information from the CDS markets faster and have also 
become more responsive to CDS information. This is consistent with a growing importance of 
CDS for loan pricing. It provides no support for the alternative hypothesis that there have 
been changes in CDS markets which have left loan pricing unaffected. This is because CDS 
markets have most likely become more efficient in recent years. Hence, information should be 
incorporated into CDS markets faster. If loan pricing had not changed at all, the lag between 
CDS and loan markets should then have increased, which is the opposite of what we observe. 
 
4. Conclusions 
  The markets for credit derivatives have provided banks with new instruments for hedging 
and pricing loans. They have also given them an opportunity to trade on the information they 
have gained in the lending process. In this paper we studied the relationship between the 
markets for loans and credit derivatives. We found that prices on credit derivatives, as 
  22observed in credit default swaps (CDS), are strongly linked with the spreads on new 
syndicated loans. They have also become the dominant factor in explaining these spreads. In 
particular, CDS prices explain loans much better than the spreads on same rated bonds, the 
natural alternative loan pricing benchmark. This is both suggestive of an incorporation of 
lending information into CDS prices through the banks' active role in CDS markets and an 
impact of CDS on loan prices. 
  We also found that, over time, loan rates reflect more current conditions in CDS markets, 
rather than being based on past CDS prices. However, at the same time, non-CDS information 
does not seem to get incorporated faster into loan decisions. This indicates that the presence 
of the CDS markets has influenced banks’ loan pricing behavior, consistent with the fact that 
banks have started to use routinely CDS to hedge credit risk and to use pseudo CDS prices as 
a loan pricing benchmark. Taken together, our results are thus suggestive of important 
relationships between loan markets and the new markets for credit derivatives.  
  If loan rates continue to be more based on actual conditions in CDS markets, this may lead 
to an overall more market-oriented pricing of loans. Such a development should be welcomed 
in that it may lead to a more efficient allocation of resources in the financial system. 
However, there are also downsides. For example, it may induce more volatility into the 
financing costs of firms. A more market-oriented pricing also suggests that banks may be less 
willing to subsidize firms which experience adverse credit conditions. This may impose 
significant costs for firms reliant on bank financing. There are also potential implications for 
financial stability. Banks have been credited with exercising a stabilizing influence over the 
business cycle since their loan decisions are less procyclical than market financing. An 
increasing dependence of loan rates on current conditions in CDS markets may reduce this 
effect and may potentially amplify business cycle volatility. 
  Our study has analyzed the pricing of syndicated loans to U.S. firms. Syndicated loans are 
typical for larger firms, for which relationship-based pricing arguably play less of a role. An 
  23interesting question for further research would be to study how CDS markets interact with the 
pricing of loans which are based on strong bank-firm relationships, for example by studying 
loan rates in more bank-based financial systems, such as Germany and Japan. 
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  27Table 1: Descriptive statistics of key variables 
This table reports the mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum, median, and maximum of spread levels and first 
differences of spread levels (spread changes) in basis points. The column DF indicates the p-value from a 
Dickey-Fuller test of the null hypothesis “time series is non-stationary” while the column KPSS reports the result 
from a Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, Shin-test of the null hypothesis “time series is stationary”. 
 
Type Description  Var.  Mean SD Min Median Max  DF    KPSS 
Loan spread B  L
B
  344.51 61.44 235.23 358.25 511.07 0.831  No 







277.38 63.55 168.54 291.62 425.00 0.798  No 
Bond spread B eom  B
B, eom 556.12 219.11 238.09 557.19 1046.19 0.671  No 
Bond spread BB eom  B
BB, eom 339.33 127.61 156.09 325.07 666.19 0.537  No 
CDS spread eom  C
eom 82.47 37.67 24.27 70.95 199.53 0.314  No 
Levels 
CDS spread mean  C  82.26 37.06 27.84 71.16 187.83  0.336  No 
Loan spread B change  ΔL
B -1.26 29.83 -96.70 0.00 96.20 0.000 Yes 






-1.59 27.60 -81.25 -2.03 80.00 0.000 Yes 
Bond spread B eom change  ΔB
B, eom -2.10 75.21 -204.22 -7.67 257.92 0.000 Yes 
Bond spread BB eom change  ΔB
BB, eom -0.19 45.91 -94.11 -9.15 170.37 0.000 Yes 
CDS spread eom change  ΔC
eom 0.52 14.55 -35.10 -1.03 57.23 0.000 Yes 
First 
differences 
CDS spread mean change  ΔC  0.49 11.94 -33.61 -0.39 46.77 0.000 Yes 
 
  28Table 2: The baseline model 
The dependent variable is the loan spread change ΔL
B
t, explanatory variables are the lagged dependent variable 
ΔL
B
t-1 and the lagged end-of-month CDS spread change ΔC
eom
t-1. P-values are calculated from robust standard 




t Coeff.  p-val.
ΔL
B
t-1 -0.26 ** 0.035
ΔC
eom
t-1 1.14 *** 0.000
Const. -1.72   0.567







2 0.3140  
 
 
  29Table 3: Model extensions with macro variables 
 
The dependent variable is the loan spread change ΔL
B
t. Explanatory variables are the lagged dependent variable 
ΔL
B
t-1, the lagged end-of-month bond spread change ΔB
B, eom
t-1, the lagged change of the implied volatility 
ΔVIXt-1, the lagged return of the S&P 500 index R_SP500t-1,  the lagged change of the five year swap rate 
ΔSWAP5t-1, the lagged change of the term premium ΔTERMt-1 (10 year risk-free rate – 1 year risk-free rate), the 
lagged change of the consumer price index ΔCPIt-1, the lagged change of industrial production ΔIPt-1, the lagged 
change of the percentage share of downgrades by the three major rating agencies ΔDOWNt-1, the lagged relative 
bid-ask spread from the CDS market ΔRELSt-1, and the lagged end-of-month CDS spread change ΔC
eom
t-1. P-
values are calculated from robust standard errors. *** , **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically significant 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level. 
 
Dep. Var.:  Model I    Model II    Model III    Model IV 
ΔL
B
t Coeff.   p-val.    Coeff.   p-val.  Coeff.   p-val.   Coeff.    p-val.
ΔL
B









-0.10   0.117    -0.06   0.458   -0.04   0.621   -0.10   0.127
ΔVIXt-1 2.67   0.167    5.44 ***  0.006   3.37   0.215   1.42   0.583
R_SP500t-1            -202.68   0.292   -144.97   0.414
ΔSWAP5t-1            10.83   0.478   10.23   0.461
ΔTERMt-1            0.02   0.893   -0.06   0.712
ΔCPIt-1            8,17   0.177   7.61   0.147
ΔIPt-1            -1.60   0.816   -3.18   0.614
ΔDOWNt-1        25.29 *  0.075   13.25   0.496   17.08   0.326
ΔRELSt-1            261.98   0.411   269.57   0.362
ΔC
eom
t-1 1.08 ***  0.000            1.05 ***  0.001
Const. -1.47    0.623    -0.28   0.929   -3.28   0.447   -3.96    0.316
Obs.   70        70     70     70   
Adj. R
2
  0.334       0.231     0.230       0.341  
 
  30Table 4: Vector error correction model for loan spread changes 
 
Panel A: Cointegration equation 
The cointegration equation reflects the long-run relationship across markets and is equivalent to a regression 
model with loan spread levels as dependent variable and contemporaneous bond and CDS spread levels as 
explanatory variables. The displayed coefficients are normalized to obtain a coefficient of 1.0 for loan spread 
changes. Results are based on the Johansen maximum likelihood estimation. P-values are calculated from robust 
standard errors. *** , **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level. 
 
Dep. Var.: ECt Coeff.  p-val.
L
B
t 1.00  ---
B
B
t -0.33 *** 0.000
Ct 0.44 * 0.081
Const. -196.04   ---
Obs.   70  
 
 
Panel B: VECM results for loan spread changes 
VECM results indicate the short-run adjustment across markets. This tables reports findings for the equation 
with loan spread changes ΔL
B
t as dependent variable and the error correction term ECt (from the cointegration 
equation in Panel A), the lagged dependent variable ΔL
B
t-1, the lagged end-of-month bond spread changes ΔB
B, 
eom
t-1, and the lagged end-of-month CDS spread changes ΔC
eom
t-1 as explanatory variables. Results are based on 
the Johansen maximum likelihood estimation. P-values are calculated from robust standard errors. *** , **, * 




t Coeff.  p-val.
ECt -0.27 *** 0.004
ΔL
B
t-1 -0.12  0.215
ΔB
B, eom
t-1 -0.10 ** 0.051
ΔC
eom
t-1 1.26 *** 0.000
Const. -2.52   0.375
Obs.   70  
R
2
  0.4212  
 
  31Table 5: The influence of CDS and bond spread changes on loan spread changes 
 
Panel A: Baseline model with bond spread changes 
The dependent variable is the loan spread change ΔL
B
t, explanatory variables are the lagged dependent variable 
ΔL
B
t-1, the lagged end-of-month bond spread change ΔB
B, eom
t-1, and the lagged end-of-month CDS spread 
change ΔC
eom
t-1. P-values are calculated from robust standard errors. *** , **, * denote that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level. 
 
  Bond and CDS spreads    Bond spreads only 
Dep. Var.: ΔL
B
t Coeff.  p-val.   Coeff.   p-val. 
ΔL
B
t-1 -0.25 * 0.057   -0.23   0.164 
ΔB
B, eom
t-1 -0.05  0.303   0.11   0.100 
ΔC
eom
t-1 1.34  0.000      
Const. -1.93 *** 0.533   -0.84   0.810 





0.3450    0.1072    
Adj. R
2 0.3150    0.0810    
 
Panel B: The loan-CDS and loan-bond relationship in separate regressions 
The dependent variable is the loan spread change ΔL
B
t and the explanatory variables are the contemporaneous 
and lagged CDS spread changes (ΔCt,  ΔC
eom
t-1 ) and bond spread changes (ΔBt, ΔB
B, eom
t-1). P-values are 
calculated from robust standard errors. *** , **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level. 
 
 Loan-CDS    Loan-bond 
Dep. Var.: ΔL
B
t Coeff.  p-val.   Coeff.   p-val. 
ΔL
B
t-1 -0.22 * 0.092   -0.23 0.156 
ΔBt    0.19 0.298 
ΔB
B, eom
t-1    0.10 0.154 
ΔCt 0.34  0.285    
ΔC
eom
t-1 0.96 *** 0.003   
Const. -1.74   0.562   -1.02 0.772 





0.3435      0.1183  
Adj. R
2 0.3140      0.0780  
 
Panel C: Determinants of CDS and bond spread changes 
The dependent variables are the CDS and bond spread changes ΔCt and ΔBt. Explanatory variables are the 
contemporaneous change of the implied volatility ΔVIXt, the return of the S&P 500 index R_SP500t, the change 
of the five year swap rate ΔSWAP5t, and the change of the term premium ΔTERMt (10 year risk-free rate – 1 
year risk-free rate). P-values are calculated from robust standard errors. *** , **, * denote that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level. 
 
Dep. Var.:  ΔCt   ΔBt
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
ΔVIXt 1.29 ** 0.013 1.58 **  0.043 
R_SP500t -88.81 * 0.069 -32.69   0.626 
ΔSWAP5t -8.24 * 0.053 -47.94 ***  0.000 
ΔTERMt 0.07  0.272 0.24 ***  0.000 
Const. 0.38   0.705 -074   0.515 





0.4239 0.7141  
Adj. R
2 0.3890 0.6970  
  32Table 6: Responsiveness of loan spread changes to CDS spread changes over time 
Panel A: Results for the baseline model by sub-periods 
The dependent variable is the loan spread change ΔL
B
t, explanatory variables are the lagged dependent variable 
ΔL
B
t-1, the contemporaneous average monthly CDS spread change ΔCt, and the lagged end-of-month CDS 
spread change ΔC
eom
t-1. P-values are calculated from robust standard errors. *** ,  **, * denote that the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level. 
 






Coeff.  p-val.   Coeff.   p-val. 
ΔL
B
t-1 -0.31 * 0.084   -0.00   0.983 
ΔCt -0.01  0.965   2.06 ** 0.016 
ΔC
eom
t-1 1.21 *** 0.001  -0.85   0.168 
Const. -1.06   0.820   -1.71   0.603 
Obs.   35     35    
R
2
  0.4662    0.2451   
 
Panel B: Average lag length and responsiveness of loan spread changes by sub-periods 
The dependent variable is the loan spread change ΔL
B
t, explanatory variables are the lagged dependent variable 
ΔL
B
t-1, the lagged bond spread changes ΔBt-1, and the lagged end-of-week CDS spread change ΔCw  from the 
indicated month and week respectively. P-values are calculated from robust standard errors. *** , **, * denote 













  Coeff. of 
ΔCw
 p-val.  R
2
4 0.17    0.659 0.1127   1.39 **  0.046  0.2031
3 0.62  **  0.042 0.1808   1.53 ***  0.003  0.3053
2 0.81  ***  0.006 0.2448   1.00 ***  0.001  0.1753
Current 
month 
1 1.02  ***  0.008 0.3036   1.04 **  0.013  0.1379
4 1.40  ***  0.000 0.4286   0.58   0.209  0.0383
3 0.82    0.200 0.1848   0.89   0.170  0.0796
2 -0.03    0.940 0.1072   0.92   0.240  0.1237
Previous 
month 
1 -0.62    0.289 0.1623   0.93   0.335  0.0988
 
  33Table 7: Analysis of lead-lag vs. contemporaneous relationships over time 
The first line (“Macro model without …”) of this table reports adjusted R
2-values (simple R
2-values in 
parentheses) from two types of regressions models for the first and second half of the sample. First, we regress 
loan spread changes ΔL
B
t on the lagged dependent variable ΔL
B
t-1, the lagged end-of-month bond spread change 
ΔB
B, eom
t-1, the lagged change of the implied volatility ΔVIXt-1, the lagged return of the S&P 500 index 
R_SP500t-1, the lagged change of the five year swap rate ΔSWAP5t-1, the lagged change of the term premium 
ΔTERMt-1, the lagged change of the consumer price index ΔCPIt-1, the lagged change of industrial production 
ΔIPt-1, the lagged change of the percentage share of downgrades by the three major rating agencies ΔDOWNt-1, 
and the lagged relative bid-ask spread from the CDS market ΔRELSt-1. Moreover, the same model is re-
estimated with contemporaneous values of the explanatory variables. The second line (“Simple model with …”) 
reports adjusted R
2-values (simple R
2-values in parentheses) from regressions with loan spread changes ΔL
B
t as 
dependent variable and the lagged dependent variable ΔL
B
t-1 as well as lagged or contemporaneous CDS spread 
changes (ΔC
eom
t-1 or ΔCt) as explanatory variables for the first and second half of the sample. 
 
  First half of sample    Second half of sample 
Model and variable 
specification 
Lag 1    Contemporaneous   Lag 1    Contemporaneous 
Macro model without 









              
Simple model with CDS 










  34Figure 1: Time series of loan, bond and CDS spread levels 
All spread levels are presented in basis points. Loan spreads represent monthly averages of loans to U.S. 
corporates with an S&P rating of BB. Bond Spreads are monthly averages of the Lehman Brothers U.S. 
corporate high-yield index for rating grades BB and are calculated above the five year swap rate. CDS spreads 
refer to the average of end-of-month spreads from all references entities in our sample and are in this figure 



















  35Figure 2: Results from the rolling window analysis 
The solid lines represent the simultaneously estimated coefficients ΔC
eom
t-1 and ΔCt from 36 rolling window 
regressions (w =1, …, 36) with loan spread changes as dependent variable. Shaded areas correspond to a 95% 
confidence interval. Each regression is based on 35 observations. Window 1 refers to the period March 2000 – 
January 2003 (first half of the sample) and window 36 to the period February 2003 – December 2005 (second 
half of the sample). 
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